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ABSTRAK
Diskursus pembangunan pada sebuah negara secara umum membicarakan tentang ba-
gaimana ide/gagasan mempengaruhi kebijakan-kebijakan perekonomian. Di Indonesia 
diskursus pembangunan terus mengalami perubahan tergantung pada rezim yang me-
merintah. Pasca reformasi, diskursus yang dominan adalah diskursus neoliberal yang 
meminimalisir peran negara dalam pembangunan. Tetapi pada masa pemerintahan 
Jokowi-JK, peran negara kembali menguat. Pemerintah merencanakan pembangunan 
infrastruktur ekonomi fisik secara masif. Pemerintah melegitimasi pilihan tindakannya 
sebagai implementasi ideologi Pancasila dan Trisakti. Namun, dengan menggunakan 
teori diskursus Ernesto Laclau dan Chantal Mouffe, artikel ini berargumen bahwa ne-
gara melegitimasi kebijakannya sebagai implementasi ideologi dengan membangun 
diskursus pembangunan infrastruktur, tetapi sesungguhnya menutupi praktik prag-
matis yang terjadi. Praktik pragmatis yang dimaksud adalah pengabaian pemerintah 
terhadap nasib dan hak warga yang terdampak akibat pembangunan infrastruktur.
Kata kunci: diskursus, pembangunan, infrastruktur, Jokowi-JK
ABSTRACT
The discussion about development discourse in a country talking about how an idea 
affect economic policies. In Indonesia, the development discourse continues to change 
depending on the ruling regime. After the reformation, the dominant discourse is a 
neoliberal one that minimizes the role of the state in development. During the reign 
of Jokowi-JK, however, the role of the state strengthened. The government plans to 
build a massive infrastructure of the physical economy. The government legitimized its 
choice of action as the implementation of the Pancasila and Trisakti ideologies. Using 
the theories of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, this article argues that the state le-
gitimizes its policies as implementing ideology by building infrastructure development 
discourse, but covers only pragmatic practices that occur. The practices themselves 
are pragmatic because the government ignored the fate and rights of citizens affected 
by infrastructure development.
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INTRODUCTION
In general, development discourse in a country examines how ideas 
can influence economic policies (Sikkink 1991; Park 2005; Pesaran 
2008; Barabantseva 2012; Gebresenbet 2014). These ideas can be 
sourced from ideology, government officials who have the power to 
implement it in the form of policies (Sikkink 1991; Barabantseva 2012; 
Gebresenbet 2014), or the epistemists in civil society who can influence 
government decisions (Park 2005; Pesaran 2008). Besides talking about 
ideas, development discourse also reveals the background of the main 
economic problems of a country and attempts to outline the steps the 
country has taken to solve the problems (Rahardjo 2012).
In the Indonesian context, the development discourse is always 
changing. During the first twenty years after independence, there was 
a consensus that socialism was the best way to plan development in In-
donesia. Socialism is the antithesis of capitalism, which was considered 
the main factor behind the colonial system of oppression and power 
(Thuy 2014, 131). When the New Order began to rule, with policy mak-
ers prioritizing the need for capitalist-style stabilization, rehabilitation 
and economic development, the policies of reducing government spend-
ing, bank lending, and subsidy spending were a shock to the system 
(Mas’oed 1989). The development model was criticized because it was 
considered contrary to the 1945 Constitution. This caused the domestic 
industry to suffer and more importantly, did not solve structural prob-
lems in the Indonesian economy. To counter this, the think tank Centre 
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) encouraged the state to 
take a greater role as a leader who coordinates and oversees national 
economic activities. This is known as state corporatism (Mallarangeng 
2002). Unfortunately, the development model that was executed caused 
structural decay, ignoring as it did social aspects. These conditions in 
turn led Indonesia into a very severe crisis starting in 1997 and culmi-
nated in the resignation of Suharto as president (Chaniago 2012).
Reforms in 1998 drove Indonesia to the era of openness and gave 
the country an opportunity to apply a different development model. 
The economic crisis also, however, opened opportunities for neoliberal 
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discourses to exert their influence in the country (Wirasenjaya 2012). 
International institutions like the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) encouraged a change in the nature and role of 
the state, from the centralization of the Old Order and the New Or-
der. Economists like Mubyarto and Sri Edi Swasono believed that the 
Indonesian government was forced to follow the paradigm of neoliber-
alism, rendering it powerless against globalization and the expansion 
of capitalism (Rahardjo 2012). Neoliberalism requires governments to 
minimize the role of the state in the economy and development to 
implement good governance, social risk management, and social safety 
nets (Carroll 2010).
The role of the state in development has, however, strengthened 
again in the era of Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla, known as Jokowi-JK 
(2014-2019). In this era, the government has made the development 
of infrastructure its main political project (Lane 2015). In the 2015-
2019 National Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMN), the gov-
ernment targets infrastructure development consisting of 2,000 km of 
roads, 1,000 km of toll roads, 3,258 railway lines, 24 ports, 49 dams, 
10 airports, 1 million hectares of irrigation, and a power plant with a 
capacity of 35 thousand megawatts (Bappenas 2014). This ambitious 
and massive project aims to realize the goals set forth in Nawacita 
(Jokowi-JK’s campaign documents), primarily economic independence. 
Warburton (2016) concluded that Jokowi-JK’s leadership style embraces 
a government-oriented statist-nationalist ideology.
The above shows that the Jokowi-JK regime dares to challenge neo-
liberal thinking and showed significant difference from the previous 
governments in the post-reform era. This article therefore answers the 
question: “Why strengthen the state’s role in infrastructure development 
in the Jokowi-JK era?” In political science literature, political factors or 
the people occupying authority can change policy and institutions. As a 
result of these changes, the paradigm and preferences change too (Bahri 
2017, 238-240). Paradigms, preferences, and ideas can be analyzed by 
examining how policy discourse is constructed as a tool to legitimize 
government choice. This article, thus, uses the theories of the discourse 
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by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe to answer the question posed. 
In short, this theory explains that discourses become hegemonic by 
intervening the empty signifier as referred to both theorists. This inter-
vention occurs through the practice of articulation. Other than that, the 
hegemony ushers in antagonism, which tries to expose things behind 
the discourses.
This article argues that the state legitimized the policy as a way to 
implement the ideology that comprises the development infrastructure 
discourse. Nevertheless, in reality it only covers pragmatic practices 
that already occurred because the government ignored the fate and 
rights of citizens affected by infrastructure development. So, ideological 
aspects of the policy do not really exist in practical level. The analysis 
in this article is divided into four sections. The first section explains 
the meaning of “development” as an empty signifier in the develop-
ment history of Indonesia, and the second defines the articulation of 
infrastructure development discourses in the Jokowi-JK era. The third 
section examines the formation of hegemony and antagonism in this 
discourse, and the fourth section clarifies the pragmatical practice of 
the implementation of infrastructure development.
DISCOURSE THEORY
Based on Laclau and Mouffe (2008, 152), discourse is a structured 
totality resulting from the practice of articulation. The assumption is 
that all objects and actions are meaningful, and that their meaning 
is conferred by historically specific systems of rules. The practice of 
articulation is any practice establishing a relationship among elements 
such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory prac-
tice. The articulation depends greatly on the context in which there is 
a power relation working to construct the discourse. Townshend (2003, 
131) therefore asserts that “meaning is discourse-dependent”. The dis-
course is always contingent, partial, relational, and never fully formed 
itself because it is always contested. Discourses exist in a dynamic arena 
without boundaries, and they will compete to become dominant and 
hegemonic.
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To be dominant and hegemonic, discourse works by intervening 
in an empty signifier (Howarth et al 2000, 9). An empty signifier is a 
discursive element that has been emptied of its content to become a 
uniting discourse (Savirani 2017, 114). Laclau (2007) exemplifies the 
application of the concept of empty signifier to explain how the forma-
tion of a public order occurs. Initially, before there was a state, there 
was no such thing as order, referring to Thomas Hobbes’ theory of the 
state of nature. Order becomes an empty signifier that is contested by 
various political forces. In the end, it is the ruler or state that defines 
and dominates what the meaning or “order” is.
The ruling regime can always build a hegemonic discourse, be-
cause it controls a variety of resources. According to Antonio Gramsci, 
hegemony works top down, that is, when the ruling class succeed in 
getting rid of opposition forces and wins both active and passive ap-
proval from its allies. On the other hand, hegemony can also work 
bottom up, when resistance arises from the community over oppres-
sion and regime pressure (Hutagalung 2008). According to Laclau and 
Mouffe, the battle between the two directions of hegemony is called 
the contestation for discourse, and the form that it takes has come to 
be known as antagonism.
The hegemony and antagonism above enables the formation of a po-
litical frontier. In this situation, a chain of equivalence is built between 
the political forces that resist the oppressive regime. An oppressive re-
gime, however, will try to absorb the demands of the opposition. De-
stabilizing the boundary separating oppressive regimes from opposing 
groups. If an oppressive regime accommodates some of the demands, 
it can break the chain of equivalence and return it to the situation of 
particularity. This condition is then referred to as a logic of difference 
(Hutagalung 2008).
This theory proposes the proposition that to understand antagonism, 
a distinction must be made between politics and the political (Mouffe 
2005, 8-9). The first term refers to things that are more detailed and for-
malistic/administrative, such as decision-making and policy implemen-
tation, while the second term refers to things that are more substantial, 
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such as ideological battles and conflicts of power. Thus, politics exists 
because previously there has been the political. Things like decision-
making and policy implementation are the result of the ideological 
battles or conflicts of power. So, to dismantle a hegemony that cov-
ers something, the political basis must be examined. Laclau further 
explains that it is politics that determines how humans act, think, and 
shape economic structures (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 34). This opin-
ion is contrary to that of Karl Marx, who postulated that the economic 
infrastructure determines the political suprastructure.
This article uses a theoretical framework for the theory of discourse 
developed by Laclau and Mouffe above. The concepts of the empty 
signifier and articulation explain the changes and continuity of develop-
ment discourse that occurred in Indonesian history to build a concept 
of infrastructure development in the style of the Jokowi-JK administra-
tion. The concepts of hegemony and antagonism explain the substantial 
political process behind the discourse of infrastructure development 
white at the same time explaining what is covered or marginalized as 
a result of the discourse.
METHODOLOGY
This article uses a qualitative approach to discourse analysis tech-
niques. Discourse analysis refers to the practice of analyzing empirical 
raw materials and information as discursive forms. This means that 
discourse analysts treat a wide range of linguistic and non-linguistic 
data—speeches, reports, manifestos, historical events, interviews, poli-
cies, ideas, even organizations and institutions—as “texts” or “writing”. 
These data are “text”, which represents what is not only written but also 
held against all the reality that is the object of observation (Howarth 
et al 2000, 4).
Laclau suggested that reading politics must be by deconstruction. 
Two stages of “reading the text” are conducted by the researcher. First, 
reality is read in simple terms (which are presented in plain view) and 
then classified. After that, the various sources of relevant data are vali-
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dated. Second, the data are further read to uncover what is not de-
livered, marginalized, ignored, and invisible in the observed reality. 
Things that do not appear in the “text” will be a reference to analyze 
power relations between the ruling regime as a dominant with the peo-
ples as the victim of oppression. “Reading” in the context of discourse 
analysis is to generate the meaning process (Raffiudin 2014, 75-77). In 
addition, this study uses in-depth interviews to validate the data.
DEV ELOPMENT AS A N EMP T Y SIGNIFIER
Indonesia’s independence on August 17, 1945, was only limited to 
political independence. Economically, the colonial government still 
controlled the Indonesian people. To achieve economic independence, 
a discourse on colonial direction developed into a national economy 
(Thuy 2014, 131). Economic decolonization or Indonesianization in-
cludes three processes: form state enterprises, promote Indonesian citi-
zens to occupy important positions in foreign companies operating in 
Indonesia, and nationalize Dutch companies (Lindblad 2009, 220).
According to the state officials at the beginning of Indonesia’s inde-
pendence, shaping the national economy is also implemented through 
development. Proclaimer Mohammad Hatta called this development 
a political problem. Politics can open the way for people and provide 
them the opportunity to improve their lot. As the colonial government 
inherited a pattern of export-oriented economy, Hatta argued the state 
should build up the domestic market by raising the people’s purchas-
ing power through the production of goods. This was seen as a basic 
requirement to grow the national economy (Rahardjo 2017). Sumitro 
Djojohadikusumo believes that development requires continuous efforts 
to address and correct structural gaps and imbalances, and therefore, 
public policy must be directed to change the conditions imposed by the 
structural gap. One approach to this is by industrialization (Wie 2005). 
In contrast to Sumitro, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara argues that people 
must first get an education in management and technology before enter-
ing industrialization. Economic development must be adjusted to the 
needs of the community, namely agriculture and natural resources, and 
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in turn, industrialization should also be directed at these two things 
(Wie 2005).
Leaders and government officials agreed that the state must play 
a role in economic development at the beginning of Indonesia’s inde-
pendence. Then, the state launched several programs aimed at growing 
the national economy, such as the Economic Urgency Plan, the For-
tress Program (Program Benteng), and the Eight Year of Development 
Plan. The Eight Year Plan is a manifestation of the principle of guided 
economy, “standing on one’s own feet” (berdiri di atas kaki sendiri) and 
self-sufficient, which was introduced by President Sukarno during the 
state speech address on August 17, 1964 (Thuy 20114, 250-255). All eco-
nomic activity was concentrated on the state. Private companies were 
forbidden to carry out activities such as export-import, unless permitted 
by the government (Castles 1965).
In the New Order era, the development orientation changed. On the 
advice of technocrats who became economic adviser and then decision-
makers, the government implemented efficiency and rationalization. 
To overcome the economic crisis and the attendant severe inflation, 
the government administered a sort of shock treatment with drastic 
stabilization, limiting state spending so that the subsidies that have been 
relied on by state companies were no longer available. The state also 
opened up and became dependent on foreign capital (Mas’oed 1989). 
This development discourse is referred to as Widjojonomics, referring 
to the “chairman” technocrat, namely Widjojo Nititsastro.
When BJ Habibie became the Minister of Research and Technology, 
the orientation of development was based in technology, with the aim 
of transforming Indonesia’s agrarian society into an industrial society. 
The strategy was to produce highly educated scientist and engineers. 
Habibie believed that human resources (HR) are important factors 
that determine the progress of the economy, a concept demonstrated 
by East Asian countries that achieved high economic growth, despite 
not having a rich of natural resources (Gie 1995, 17; Amir 2008, 318). 
Once again, the role of the state was strengthened in leading national 
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economic development. This development discourse is referred to as 
Habibinomics.
Entering the era of reform, the government’s development direc-
tion was forced to conform to the demands of international institutions 
such as the World Bank and the IMF. These institutions encouraged 
states not to overly interfere with economic activities, and instead re-
quired them to make structural adjustments by implementing good 
governance, social risk management, and social safety nets (Carroll 
2010). One form of this development model is the design of the 2011-
2015 Master Plan for the Acceleration and Expansion of Indonesian 
Economic Development (MP3EI). In MP3EI, infrastructure develop-
ment, such as drinking water, transportation, roads, electricity, oil and 
gas, waste management, irrigation, and telecommunications are trans-
formed into business and industry (Rachman dan Yanuardy 2014, 23). 
The state’s only role in this scheme is as the regulator and facilitator.
It can be concluded that the discourse of development in Indonesia’s 
history is always changing. Referring to the discourse theory of Laclau 
and Mouffe, the meaning of development here is contingent, relational, 
and never forms itself, furthermore the development discourse has al-
ways opposed, dismantled and transformed itself. It is relational because 
it is very dependent on the ruling government regime. The meaning 
and the character of development will thus also be transformed along 
with the change of regime. In this case, the meaning of development 
has become an empty signifier.
A RTICUL ATION OF INFR ASTRUCTUR E 
DEV ELOPMENT DISCOURSE
The idea of development in the style of the Jokowi-JK administra-
tion can be tracked from the 2014 Nawacita document, which contains 
the vision and promise of his campaign. The document stated that the 
weakening of the joints of the national economy was one of the main 
problems of the nation and offered the solution of returning to the ideo-
logical path, Pancasila and Trisakti. Pancasila is the basis that provides 
direction in nation building and Trisakti is the basis for the develop-
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ment of national character and the foundation of future national poli-
cies. Their concrete form is through economic independence, which is 
understood as the ability of the state to meet the needs of society, both 
basic needs such as clothing, food and shelter, and basic services such as 
education and health. The state is considered to have the responsibility 
to design and guarantee that all economic policies are directed to meet 
these two issues. The Jokowi-JK government’s strategy to meet basic 
needs and provide basic services is to build good infrastructure. Good 
infrastructure will improve people’s productivity and competitiveness 
in the international market (Nawacita 2014).
After Jokowi-JK was elected became the president and the vice presi-
dent of Indonesia for the 2014-2019 period, the Transition Team was 
formed on August 4, 2014. The team determined that the implementa-
tion of development must be based on justice and equity, not electoral 
based. In this case, the government is designed to align the direction 
of national development toward Pancasila and Trisakti (Interview with 
Arif Budimanta, May 9, 2019). The team, together with the National 
Development Planning Agency (Bappenas), then folded the campaign 
document Nawacita into the 2015-2019 RPJMN document, stating that 
the vision is the realization of a sovereign, independent, and personal-
ity (kepribadian) based on gotong royong. To realize this vision, the 
government estimates investment needs of up to Rp 5,519 trillion to 
build infrastructure (Bappenas 2014; Negara 2016, 146). One of the 
implications of the policy was an increase in the infrastructure budget 
in 2015, which reached 14,46% of the state budget. In the previous 
year, the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono-Boediono administration only 
budgeted 9,48% of the state budget to build infrastructure (Adam 2018).
On November 17, 2014, Jokowi reduced the budget subsidy of fuel 
oil in the 2015 state budget from Rp 276 trillion to Rp 64.67 trillion. 
The government diverted those funds instead to provide a capital injec-
tion to state-owned enterprises (SOEs), an increase in village funds, and 
infrastructure development (Negara 2015). Jokowi understated that the 
move was an unpopular policy, as it implied that the government is not 
pro-people. According to him, however, the policy was an attempt to 
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stop the wrong practice, namely fuel subsidies that have only been en-
joyed by millions of private cars or the haves, rather than being spent for 
those who live in more deprive areas as well as those who live below the 
poverty line (Cabinet Secretariat of The Republic of Indonesia 2015).
For many years the state budget has included the fuel subsidy, begin-
ning in 2012 when the trade balance of oil and gas was in deficit due 
to declining production while consumption is increased (Tempo 2014). 
Jokowi reduced the subsidies to carry out the transformation of national 
economic fundamental and to change the development paradigm from 
consumptive to productive. Productive development begins by carrying 
out development from the periphery, regions and villages, to increase 
the productivity of HR, and science and technology driven by creative, 
innovative, and persistent mental attitudes (Cabinet Secretariat of The 
Republic of Indonesia 2015). This is in contrast to the approach of the 
SBY government (2004-2014), in which development was directed to 
a densely populated area so that people immediately feel its impact 
(Tempo 2015a).
After implementing the transformation of economic fundamentals 
in its first year, the Jokowi government implemented an acceleration 
of national development the following year. Acceleration was needed 
because since independence, Indonesia was considered unable to break 
the chains of poverty, unemployment, and economic and social inequal-
ity. Accelerated infrastructure development as a foundation for national 
development was intended to strengthen inter-regional connectivity and 
reduce inequality and social disparities (Cabinet Secretariat of The 
Republic of Indonesia 2016).
After the transformation of economic fundamentals and an accel-
eration in development, the next step goal for the Jokowi administra-
tion was economic equality with justice. The hope was to foster cen-
ters of economic growth, by stimulating infrastructure development 
throughout the country rather than focusing solely on Java, as former 
regimes had done. With the growth of new economic growth centers, 
Jokowi hoped to stimulate national pride and developed the feeling of 
“the presence of the state” among the citizens (Cabinet Secretariat of 
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The Republic of Indonesia 2017). In a broader context, this shows the 
government’s commitment to maintaining the well-being of national 
integration.
Jokowi called for infrastructure development to be economically sus-
tainable in the long term, not only to make Indonesian economy more 
efficient and competitive, but also to unite the people of Indonesia. 
Jokowi does not interpret infrastructure development simply as physical 
development, but also as a form of developing civilization and culture 
to face the challenges of the present and future (Cabinet Secretariat of 
The Republic of Indonesia 2018). The concrete results of this discourse 
give social factors more priority than economic or business factors. This 
is why the government assign SOEs to work on infrastructure develop-
ment projects which are less attractive for private companies because 
of their long-term profit period, such as the Trans Sumatera highway.
Through 2018, the Jokowi-JK government succeeded in building 
3,432 km of national roads, 947 km of toll roads, 39,8 km of bridges, 
134 suspension bridges, 754,59 km of railway lines, 10 airports, 19 ports, 
and 17 dams (The President of the Republic of Indonesia 2018). This 
achievement is still far from the target stated in the RPJMN because 
many of these infrastructure developments are too huge and difficult 
to handle (Salim and Negara 2019, 255).
Most constructions completed by the Jokowi-JK administration were 
called projects that had not been completed by previous governments. 
Completing these stalled projects can be understood as an attempt by 
Jokowi-JK government to build a political frontier. This article argues 
that the construction of massive infrastructure into a political frontier is 
emerging as the result of discourse articulation of infrastructure devel-
opment in the Jokowi-JK era. The government believes that infrastruc-
ture is the basic capital for a country to move forward and infrastruc-
ture development should take place soon by the state because the cost 
will be more expensive when delayed. The neglect of infrastructure by 
previous governments failed to bring Indonesia on par with developed 
countries. In a 2014 interview with Foreign Affairs, Jokowi stated that 
the former government had an infrastructure budget, but no system to 
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distribute it to benefit the people. The Jokowi-JK government created 
a new political frontier to address the antagonism between change and 
the status quo, between the working and doing nothing, and between 
the pro-people government and the not pro-people.
The articulation of the infrastructure development discourse is thus 
an effort of the Jokowi-JK government to interpret development, which 
has become an empty signifier. This gave rise to the term “Jokowinom-
ics” as a signifier of identity patterns and thoughts that underlie infra-
structure development policies. The term refers to the designation of 
the ‘leaders’ approach in managing their economic policies (Sasangka 
et al 2017), and became popular when Arif Budimanta wrote an article 
in The Jakarta Post titled “The Concept of Jokowinomics” in October 
2014. Jokowinomics is characterized by various concept such as build-
ing from the periphery, bring the state to the people, mental revolution, 
economic productivity, and so on (Interview with Arif Budimanta, May 
9, 2019).
HEGEMON Y A ND A NTAGONISM IN 
INFR ASTRUCTUR E DEV ELOPMENT DISCOURSE
When referring to Mouffe’s concept of politics and the political, 
the articulation practice of the infrastructure development discourse 
can be said as a politics as it pertains to the empirical case, namely an 
economic policy. Meanwhile, to understand the political aspects of this 
discourse, it is necessary to analyze the government’s efforts to get rid 
of opposition forces and win the approval of its allies to make the de-
velopment of infrastructure as a hegemonic discourse. But at the same 
time, the opposition, as well as elements representing the power of civil 
society, would appear to criticize the government’s efforts as hegemonic 
discourse, revealing a discursive battle or antagonism.
In the 2015-2019 RPJMN (Bappenas 2014), it is written that poli-
tics is a necessary condition in the national development strategy. The 
politics in question is the support of various existing forces to create 
political stability that will assist the government in launching its infra-
structure development agenda. In making this happen, the government 
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politically accommodates its supporting parties and absorbs opposition 
forces that have the potential to delegitimize its power.
The politics of accommodation are reflected in the composition of 
34 ministers in the Kabinet Kerja, where the percentage of representa-
tion from political parties is quite large. Political influence is especially 
apparent in the appointment of the National Democratic Party politi-
cian, Prasetyo, as Attorney General (Tempo 2015b). Six of the nine 
members of the Presidential Advisory Council appointed by Jokowi 
also came from political parties (Tempo 2015c), and volunteers and 
other supporters of Jokowi awarded commissioner position in SOEs 
(Sudrajat 2017).
The Jokowi-JK government required strong political support at the 
beginning of the administration because their supporting parties only 
have 37% number of seats in the parliament. This reality forced Jokowi 
to consolidate his power (Warburton 2016). The first year of Jokowi-JK 
was a transactional and transformational time (Agustino 2015) primarily 
because the government must conduct the politics of accommodation 
to carry out its development agenda. At the same time, transforma-
tional steps were also taken, such as cutting fuel subsidies, building 
from periphery, encouraging a mental revolution, and dare to involve 
the Eradication Corruption of Commission (KPK) and the Financial 
Transaction Reports and Analysis Center (PPATK) before appointing 
ministers and other officials.
The politics of accommodation for political stability and smooth 
development are evident in some of Jokowi’s reshuffling of the cabinet. 
Jokowi called for the first reshuffle in August 2015 to improve cabinet 
consolidation and strengthen the economic team, because at the be-
ginning of his tenure, the economy was sluggish and not performing. 
Research by the Institute of Development of Economics and Finance 
(INDEF) found that there were no breakthroughs, only failed efforts 
to transform economic structures. Further, the government did not 
well-prepared and ended up with low budget absorption. Economic 
growth in the first quarter of 2015 was only 4,7% which was well below 
the government’s target of 7% (Rusli et al 2015).
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The second reshuffle in July 2016 caused by several ministers were 
publicly making “noise” in objecting to the government’s plans. For 
example, a disagreement arose between Minister of Energy and Mineral 
Resources Sudirman Said and Coordinating Minister of Maritime Rizal 
Ramli related to the management of the Masela Block, or noise-related 
to Minister of Transportation Ignasius Jonan about the management 
of the fast train project from Jakarta to Bandung. Jokowi declared that 
the government’s performance should be compact and in line with the 
vision and mission of the president (Tempo 2016). His cabinet reshuffle 
became more political when government ministers had to relinquish 
seats to the two political parties that began to support the government, 
the Golkar Party and the National Mandate Party.
The most important negative issue facing the Jokowi-JK government 
was the government’s impartiality toward Islamic groups. This issue is 
disruptive to political stability, especially when there were several series 
of Islamic demonstrations that required the Governor of Jakarta at the 
time, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, sued for imprisonment for blasphemy. 
Jokowi is on Basuki’s side and several of Jokowi’s policies received strong 
criticism from Islamic groups. The first was the legalization of the Law 
on Mass Organizations that allowed the government to dissolve the 
mass organization Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia. This group very vocally 
wishes to replace democracy with the Caliphate system. Secondly was 
the government’s attitude which was considered less appreciative to the 
ulamas because it allowed legal case to proceed against them to occur, 
as it happened to the Chairman of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), 
Rizieq Shihab.
Responding to anti-Islamic sentiment, Jokowi undertook several 
steps to try to embrace and gain the sympathy of the Islamic group, 
including regular visits to Islamic boarding schools in the regions, es-
tablishing National Santri Day which is commemorated every October 
22, issuing a day’s discourse wearing sarung, and appointed the Chair 
of the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) Ma’ruf Amin as candidate 
for vice president in the 2019 Presidential Election. According to Greg 
Fealy (Handayani 2018), Jokowi’s use of political Islam in Indonesia 
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was a mere symbol for political purposes. Because of this lip service 
and because Islamic groups themselves do not have a clear political 
program based on Islamic principles, the influence of Islamic leaders 
in government decision-making has been minimal.
Two aforementioned steps, namely, political accommodations and 
gaining the sympathy of Islamic groups, are attempts by the government 
to absorb rather than eradicate opposition forces. With these forces in 
line, the government has won the approval of its allies to legitimize 
infrastructure development agendas.
After achieving successful political stability, the next political chal-
lenge the government faces is that of building the infrastructure itself. 
Over the years, the structural obstacles that must be faced by the gov-
ernment in infrastructure development are a matter of exemption or 
land acquisition and financing issues. Furthermore, a decentralized 
political system has resulted in the central government also having to 
deal with the complicated flow of the bureaucracy that also involves 
local governments (Davidson 2015; Utomo 2017).
Via Presidential Regulation Number 26 of 2015, Jokowi formed the 
Presidential Staff Office (KSP), a non-structural institution to improve 
the smooth control of national priority programs, the administration of 
presidential political communication, and the management of strategic 
issues. The president carries out his political efforts through the func-
tion of the KSP, which ensures that his vision, mission, and promises 
can be achieved. On a daily basis, then, the KSP oversees all Nawacita 
programs and reports its supervision periodically to Jokowi. The KSP 
further works to unravel the bottleneck that hinders the implementa-
tion of infrastructure development (Interview Gibran Sesunan, April 
4, 2019). One of the KSP’s duties is to help the government deal with 
four problems in infrastructure development, namely land acquisition, 
financing, cross-sectoral coordination between ministries and institu-
tions, and local government support related to handling social impacts.
One consequence of the Jokowi-JK government’s prioritizing infra-
structure development is the attendant neglect of the other sectors and 
issues. This gives rise to resistance and led to antagonism between 
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various political forces because their interests may collide with and 
confront each other. Antagonisms arise usually from two existing politi-
cal forces, namely political opposition and civil society organizations 
and intellectuals.
Political opposition builds the narrative that the government only 
gives the appearance of effectiveness, does not answer economic prob-
lems, and only acts in electoral interests. For the opposition, infrastruc-
ture development is the government’s obligation, not an achievement, 
and the discourse of infrastructure development is considered to be per-
formed for appearances only. Infrastructure development also does not 
answer economic problems with an example of logistical costs, which 
are in fact still expensive. Further, infrastructure development should 
support the distribution of domestic products to support domestic in-
dustries. The government also builds infrastructure with a pragmatic 
approach, electoral interests, for example, quickly finishing a structure 
to host the inauguration ceremony, there, even though the construction 
is not necessarily in accordance with societal or economic needs (Jppn.
com 2019; Prabowo 2018; Thomas 2019).
Antagonisms arising from civil society and intellectual groups are 
issues largely ignored by the government due to the hegemony of the 
infrastructure development discourse. Such antagonisms include the 
resolution of human right issues, the eradication of corruption, envi-
ronmental problems, and agrarian conflicts. Disregard for these issues, 
for example, is reflected in Jokowi’s State Address which barely touches 
on them. Regarding human rights issues, for example, according to 
a 2018 report by Amnesty International, there were 39 homicides in 
Papua involving state officials, but none of the cases were processed.
The Jokowi-JK government has had to address corruption. The Anti-
Corruption Study Center of the University of Gadjah Mada (UGM 
Pukat) assessed the direction and strategies to eradicate and prevent cor-
ruption stated in the RPJMN. First, UGM Pukat found that the harmo-
nization sought through the draft Law of Corruption (Corruption Bill) 
stagnated and did not even appear in the national legislation program 
priorities. Second, criminalization present at the outset of the Jokowi-
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JK government weakened KPK (Corruption Eradication Committee). 
Third, from 2015 to 2017, the KPK enforcement statistics still noted the 
trend of increasing corruption of priority sectors, namely the prevention 
of procurement of goods and services by employees of both SOEs and 
private enterprises. Fourth, the strategic agenda on community aware-
ness of preventive measures has not been implemented through means 
such as anti-corruption courses in universities (Syambudi 2018).
According to Wahana Lingkungan Hidup (Walhi), the massive de-
velopment of infrastructure under the pretext of improving people’s 
welfare can result in governmental neglect of the environmental im-
pact. The evidence supporting this statement is the number of cases of 
human rights violations against environmental fighters, as many as 93 
cases from 2014 to 2018. Three of them are the cases of Salim Kancil in 
East Java, Indra Pelani in Jambi and Poro Duka in East Nusa Tenggara 
(Putri 2018). This problem is also related to agrarian conflicts.
INDEF is a civil society organization that specifically criticizes in-
frastructure development policies in the Jokowi-JK era, and according to 
their research, there are some weakness in the government’s infrastruc-
ture development. First, the development is funded by debt, the uses of 
which can lead to a weakening of Rupiah. Second, raw materials and 
capital goods for infrastructure development, such as iron, steel, and 
electrical machinery, rely primarily on imports. This places a burden 
on the state budget because it increases the deficit in the trade bal-
ance. Third, infrastructure development that involves more SOEs and 
their subsidiary will edge other contractors out, especially small busi-
ness from the middle and lower classes. Data from the Construction 
Contractors Association of Indonesia (Gapeksi) reveal that thousands 
of contractors in Indonesia have bankrupt during Jokowi-JK’s reign (Sa-
putri 2018).
Measures of the Jokowi-JK government that give priority to infra-
structure development and ignore other issues indicate an attempt to 
construct hegemonic discourse. The emergence of resistance from vari-
ous civil society and intellectual forces that oppose the various excesses 
of the policy, such as Amnesty International, UGM Pukat, Walhi, and 
315IDEOLOGY AND PRAGMATISM
INDEF is a form of debate or discursive practice between the govern-
ment and non-government in the public sphere. It is when each power 
-government, opposition and civil society- articulates or builds relation-
ships between elements, that antagonism or contestation of meaning 
occurs. The various strengths of civil society can become chains of 
equivalence to counter government dominance in infrastructure de-
velopment.
PR AGM ATIC PR ACTICES IN 
INFR ASTRUCTUR E DEV ELOPMENT
The character of hegemony tends to cover something and a decon-
struction is needed to uncover the things behind it. When referring 
to the articulation of the discourse of infrastructure development, the 
impact of the infrastructure projects to the affected people affected not 
submitted into and did not appear in any official reports. This shows 
that infrastructure development is legitimized by ideology but is imple-
mented in a pragmatic way, in practice by the government.
Society is of course affected by infrastructure development, usually 
in the social, economic, and ecological arenas. This impact is related to 
threats to the survival of the community and the natural landscape and 
environment at the location of the development. Restitution for land 
used for the benefit of infrastructure development is one mechanism to 
reduce the burden of the people affected, but sometimes the compensa-
tion received is not worth the loss suffered (Setyawati 2015). The process 
of infrastructure development always begins with land acquisition. In 
developing countries such as Indonesia, residents feel a strong bond to 
the acquired land and this bond becomes the basis of identity (David-
son 2015, 69-70). Land is the source of people’s livelihood, and access 
to land determines their class position and status. The problem of land 
acquisition on a large scale thereby becomes a structural problem that 
continues to hamper the progress of infrastructure development that is 
deemed “land hungry” (Salim and Negara 2019).
This article examines the example of the process of land acquisition 
development for the International Airport West Java (BIJB), which was 
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started and completed in the reign of Jokowi-JK. Planned since 2005 
and one of the listed projects in MP3EI, BIJB is located in District 
Kertajati, Majalengka, West Java, and has been operating since May 
24, 2018. Due to constraints posed by land acquisition, construction 
had been delayed. Only in the Jokowi era did development continue 
after the central government injected Rp 2.3 trillion from the state 
budget. The airport, with a targeted capacity of up to 5.6 million pas-
sengers per year is expected to trigger a new economic growth center 
in West Java that is not based in Bandung, Bekasi, Bogor or Cirebon 
(Gumiwang 2018).
This land acquisition process for the airport did not run smoothly 
and encountered numerous problems. The Intensive Agrarian Reform 
Consortium (KPA), which oversaw the project argued that the acquisi-
tion process was not transparent. The airport development planning 
document states that the land needed is 1,800 hectares, but the area 
of the acquired land was 5,000 hectares. The extra land was needed 
for the construction of supporting infrastructure such as toll roads, 
aero-city, hotels, restaurants, shopping centers, and the industrial area. 
This indicates that the true development of the BIJB is full of private 
interests. One problem with the project was the socialization related 
to this plan did not involve all affected residents: the government and 
project developers just liaised with the village chief. Moreover, the gov-
ernment did not give the option of cash compensation, land replace-
ment, relocation, or equity participation of citizens as mandated by law. 
Unilaterally, compensation was given to affected residents (Interview 
with Dewi Kartika, April 1, 2019).
The company at the helm of the project development BIJB acquired 
land from 11 villages in Kertajati with 1,305 households. The first ac-
quisition took place in 2009 in two villages, Kertajati and Kertasari, and 
the affected residents were not allowed to have a previous deliberation. 
The next acquisition took place in nine other villages and residents of 
one of them, Sukamulya village, with a total land area of 33 hectares, 
refused to sell their land because they were not willing to leave their 
fields and abandon their profession as farmers. The land in Sukamulya 
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was included in the plan to become a runway for BIJB. Bambang Nurd-
iansyah (Fahriza 2017) opines that the story of Sukamulya residents 
illustrates how the socialization process of the BIJB development plan 
did not involve all the affected residents as mandated in the president’s 
law and regulations. He states:
“Residents were never consulted by the village head, suddenly we 
had to face the fact that they had declared to agree (surrendering) 
their land (to) be used as airport land. Even though the residents 
never knew about the agreements. These agreements are a public 
deception. Residents were never consulted, suddenly a ministerial 
decree was issued that Sukamulya had to be displaced for the devel-
opment of BIJB” (Fahriza 2017).
According to the West Java Regional Secretary, Iwa Karniwa, all 
citizens of the land to be acquired were to be remunerated at a decent 
price. He further appealed for residents who received compensation to 
use their money for productive matters. Iwa further stated:
“Yes, we, as the government, pay a fair price. We understand what 
people need. This is precisely to improve the lives of the people in 
Majalengka and surrounding areas, including West Java and na-
tional level. So, that the society can release sincerely with a reason-
able price. Now, people in Majalengka after receiving compensation 
money, they should be more productive. They can buy more land 
or find the cheaper one quickly. Other than that, they can also 
buy a new house and if there still any remaining use for capital in 
other business. The development of BIJB will continue, because the 
airport is bigger than Soetta Airport. It is also in the interest and 
progress in general, which will boost the economy in the Majalengka 
region, for the provincial and state in general” (Masnurdiansyah 
2016).
Other Sukamulya citizens named Otong, explains that the com-
pensation provided by government is very small. The government only 
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appreciates the acquired land with a value of Rp 50 thousands per 
meter or Rp 700 thousands per brick (14 meters) plus a house building 
worth Rp 67 million. Meanwhile to buy a replacement land in another 
place the price has reached Rp 1-4 million per brick. Many residents 
displaced by the BIJB development project were unable to rebuild their 
lives. Otong confirmed that residents were asked to sign a memoran-
dum of understanding at a price unilaterally determined by the govern-
ment and not given the opportunity to negotiate when the funds were 
disbursed. The government also promised to relocate residents, but the 
realization did not materialize (Renaldi 2017).
The West Java Provincial Government through the National Land 
Agency (BPN) responsible for making the land available, took measure-
ments unilaterally on November 17, 2016, by deploying officers from 
the Indonesian National Army (TNI), the Republic of Indonesia Police 
(Polri), and the Civil Service Police Unit (Satpol PP). Several residents 
were beaten and arrested for blocking the measurement process (Kresna 
2016). Then, it can be said that infrastructure development has acquired 
the productive agricultural land owned by Sukamulya residents. In this 
regard, the environmental impact assessment (Amdal) issued in 2006 
called Sukamulya unproductive land due to its low production level 
of only about six quintals of rice per hectare. According to Bambang 
(Fahriza 2017), land in Sukamulya produces up to seven tons of dry rice. 
If this is indeed true, the development of infrastructure specifically the 
BIJB project, clearly contradicted the other Jokowi mission, namely, to 
achieve food sovereignty.
The authorities carried out the land acquisition execution because 
there were regulations that allowed it. Jokowi signed Presidential Regu-
lation Number 148 of 2015 about the Implementation of Land Procure-
ment for Development in the Public Interest, which accelerated the 
convoluted stage of land acquisition, in which ‘residents’ complaints 
on their land are handled within three working days. If the dispute 
has not been resolved within the time period, the determination of the 
location is deemed to be agreed upon by all parties. It can therefore be 
concluded that because the land owned by Sukamulya residents was 
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included in the BIJB development plan, there was no other choice for 
the residents but to surrender.
During the land acquisition on November 17, 2016, the government 
deployed 2,000 members of the Police Mobile Brigade (Brimob) armed 
with rifles. Residents protested the acquisition process, prompting Bri-
mob to take repressive action and fire tear gas the protesters. In fact, 
according to Bambang’s story (Fahriza 2017), members of the police 
were treating citizens arbitrarily. The police burned pos warga, a pub-
lic shelter that residents used for accommodating guests, and arrested 
citizens who rebelled. Concerned Sukamulya residents gathered in the 
village hall after this tense situation went on for three days.
Following this, the KSP invited citizen representatives to advocate 
in Jakarta on January 6, 2017, and as a result recommend the provincial 
government to form a conflict resolution team in Sukamulya, consist-
ing of the involved residents. Unfortunately, however, the team was 
not formed until the acquisition was completed and the BIJB began 
operating. As mentioned in the previous section, in this case, the KSP 
did its job to ensure the infrastructure development stayed on track to 
further President Jokowi’s agenda.
The Sukamulya case is one of 100 agrarian conflicts that occurred 
during 2016 as a result of massive infrastructure development. The table 
below details the number of cases of agrarian conflicts and amount of 
land associated with infrastructure development.
Table 1 
Number of Cases and Land Infrastructure Development 
Due to Agrarian Conflicts, 2014-2018.
Year Number of Cases Land Size (Ha)
2014 215 74.405,16
2015 70 10.603
2016 100 35.824
2017 94 52.607,9
2018 16 4.859,32
Source: Processed from the KPA Annual Reports from 2014 to 2018.
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The decrease in agrarian conflicts in the infrastructure was not 
caused by the completion of the conflict or the improved approach 
taken by the government toward affected citizens. The decrease was 
because most National Strategic Programs (PSN) have entered the con-
struction phase. This means that for most projects, land acquisition is 
almost complete (Konsorsium Pembaruan Agraria 2019).
Resistance from civil society groups and organizations to the devel-
opment of the BIJB was formed through an alliance of the National 
Committee for Agrarian Reform (KNPA) which is included 25 orga-
nizations, including the KPA, KontraS, Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nu-
santara, Walhi, and the Sajogyo Institute. This alliance was a form of 
antagonism against the government’s hegemony in building the BIJB. 
The alliance filed a petition through change.org channel to demand 
that President Jokowi stop the acquisition of Sukamulya village land. 
The petition stated:
“This project (BIJB) is loaded with cronies of the authorities, the 
practice of manipulation and corruption in land acquisition. It is the 
people who bear all the suffering from the ways of implementing 
such a project. The status of 10 displaced villagers in Kertajati be-
came unclear. They not only lost their homeland, but also could not 
afford to buy shelter and paddy fields that were as fertile as before. 
For the sake of launching and guarding the measurement process by 
force, the Governor (West Java) has deployed a combined apparatus 
of more than two thousand fully armed [police] personnel. The act 
caused terror for Sukamulya residents. What is the difference be-
tween the development of the New Order era and what you [Jokowi] 
are doing now? We request: Cancel the immediate construction of 
BIJB on Sukamulya Village land. Don’t destroy Sukamulya Village 
from this republic map. We also ask to stop repressive actions, in-
timidation, and criminalization of residents of Sukamulya Village. 
We also ask to investigate thoroughly the indications of corruption in 
land acquisition and land acquisition in the previous villages which 
have obviously impoverished the people. We also request that Presi-
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dent Jokowi ensure that land acquisition anywhere in the country 
must not be carried out in barbaric ways in the form of evictions 
accompanied by the deployment of officials” (Change.org 2017).
The KNPA Alliance demonstrates that civil society organizations 
can unite to form a chain of equivalence to deal with state hegemony 
in carrying out its infrastructure development. Ultimately, the Alliance’s 
goal was not achieved, BIJB development continues and the airport is 
currently operating. The Alliance succeeded, however, in antagonism 
and waging a discourse battle against the state in the face of its hege-
mony. Alliances such as the KNPA are needed to prevent state hege-
mony from becoming totalitarianism.
The Sukamulya case shows how the government acquired land 
for BIJB development by manipulative means, also referred to as land 
grabbing. In a land grab, villagers are not involved in the project’s so-
cialization and deliberation, even though government rules ostensibly 
include them. The government was simply not concerned with how 
they handled the affected citizens in this case. It seems that Jokowi’s 
instruction for minimal negative impact and preserving the commu-
nity’s social and cultural life is being ignored. In fact, the massive in-
frastructure development schemes of the Jokowi-JK administration that 
aimed to strengthen the state’s role in development have made room for 
greater investments in the agrarian field. The penetration of capital and 
markets eventually removes people from the land that is their source of 
livelihood. Even though the government legitimizes its policy choices 
in building massive infrastructure as an implementation of ideology, 
in practice a pragmatic approach must still occur. The discourse of 
infrastructure development legitimized by ideology but covers only 
pragmatic practices that occur. The practices are pragmatic because 
the government ignored the fate and rights of citizens affected by in-
frastructure development.
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CONCLUSION
This article shows that the state legitimizes its policies as implement-
ing ideology by advancing its infrastructure development discourse, 
but it covers pragmatic practices that occur. The magnitude of the 
constraints, however, forced the government to act, which then harmed 
the affected people owing to the infrastructure development. This ar-
ticle shows that ideological discourse is not always applied as a tool of 
legitimacy and becomes the true reason behind a policy, but it can also 
be an attempt to cover up the reality.
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